Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes:: An evolutionary approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tröger, T
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2803
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 375-402
• 关键词: sunk costs; Nash Demand Game; EVOLUTION; hold-up problem; forward induction

摘要

Two bargaining parties play the Nash Demand Game to share a pie whose size is determined by one party's investment decision. Various investment levels are subgame-perfect. Adding the investment decision to Young's evolutionary bargaining model yields the following long-run outcome: efficient investment prevails and the investor's share of the pie approximates die maximum of (i) the smallest share that induces efficient investment, even if the investor expects to appropriate the available pie from every inefficient investment, and (ii) half of the pie, The result favors forward induction to subgame consistency and equity theory to hold-ups. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.