Prices, delay, and the dynamics of trade

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moreno, D; Wooders, J
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Arizona; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2822
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 304-339
• 关键词: Decentralized markets; asymmetric information; Trade dynamics; matching; bargaining; delay

摘要

We characterize the dynamics of trading patterns and market composition when trade is bilateral, finding a trading pat trier is costly, prices arc determined by bargaining, and preferences are private information. We show that equilibrium is inefficient and exhibits delay as sellers price discriminate between buyers with different values. As frictions vanish, transaction prices are asymptotically competitive and the welfare loss of inefficient trading approaches zero. even though the trading patterns continue to be inefficient and delay persists. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).