Imitation and experimentation in changing contests
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Squintani, F; Välimäki, J
署名单位：
University of Rochester; University of Southampton
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2001.2889
发表日期：
2002
页码：
376-404
关键词：
摘要：
This paper analyzes the equilibrium play of individuals that are randomly matched to play a contest where the dominant action changes over time. Under myopic decision making, players adopt imitation strategies similar to those observed in evolutionary models with sampling from past play in the population. If the players are patient, equilibrium strategies display elements of experimentation in addition to imitation. If the changes in the environment are infrequent enough, these strategies succeed in coordinating almost all of the players on the dominant action almost all of the time. The myopic rules, on the other hand, result in miscoordination for a positive fraction of time. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).