Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dutta, B; Peters, H; Sen, A
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2896
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 392-416
• 关键词: Public goods; probabilistic mechanism; strategy-proofness; random dictatorship

摘要

Public good economies where agents are endowed with strictly convex continuous single-peaked preferences on a convex subset of Euclidean space are considered. Such an economy arises for instance in the classical problem of allocating a given budget to finance the provision of several public goods where the agents have monotonically increasing strictly convex continuous preferences. A probabilistic mechanism assigns a probability distribution over the feasible alternatives to any profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper establishes that any strategy-proof (in the sense of A. Gibbard, Econometrica 45 (1977), 665--681) and unanimous mechanism must be a random dictatorship. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D71, H40, C60. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).