Convergence results for unanimous voting
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Martinelli, C
署名单位：
Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2001.2848
发表日期：
2002
页码：
278-297
关键词：
摘要：
This paper derives a necessary condition for unanimous voting to converge to the perfect information outcome when voters are only imperfectly informed about the alternatives. Under some continuity assumptions. the condition is also sufficient for the existence of a sequence of equilibria that exhibits convergence, The requirement is equivalent to that found by Milgrom [1979, Econometrica 47, 679 688] for information aggregation in single-prize auctions. An example illustrates that convergence may be reasonably fast for small committees. However, if voters have common preferences, unanimity is not the optimal voting rule. Unanimity rule makes sense only as a way to ensure minority views are respected. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).