-
作者：Laslier, JF; Picard, N
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：Within the framework of pure redistribution (dividing one unit of a homogeneous good among identical individuals), the paper analyses the redistribution that arises from Downsian. two-party, electoral competition. It appears that the strategic behavior of vote-maximizing parties leads them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
-
作者：Nandeibam, S
作者单位：University of Birmingham
摘要：We examine the problem of output sharing in a moral hazard in team situation. Although we do not consider any particular procedure, we assume that the team uses some procedure to decide a sharing rule before actual production takes place (for example, this may be a bargaining process or a team welfare maximization problem). This must take into account that the team will play a noncooperative game in the production process conditional on the chosen sharing rule. We show that the procedure for d...
-
作者：Schmitz, PW
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：Consider a research lab that owns a patent on a new technology but cannot develop a marketable final product based on the new technology. There are two downstream firms that might successfully develop the new product. If the downstream firms' benefits from being the sole supplier of the new product are private information, the research lab will sometimes sell two licenses, even though under complete information it would have sold one exclusive license. This is in contrast to the standard resul...
-
作者：Barberà, S; Beviá, C
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society, The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society ...
-
作者：Becker, RA; Tsyganov, EN
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We prove an existence theorem for a stationary perfect foresight equilibrium under borrowing constraints in a two-sector model with infinitely lived heterogeneous agents. The most patient agent holds all the capital in this solution. We also show that if the capital goods sector is capital intensive and capital income is increasing in the aggregate capital stock, then the aggregate capital stock eventually is monotonic and converges to the steady state stock. If the consumption goods sector is...
-
作者：Bhaskar, V; Vega-Redondo, F
作者单位：University of Essex; Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：We provide a theoretical foundation for the use of Markov strategies in repeated games with asynchronous moves. If admissible strategies must display Finite (arbitrarily long) memory and each player incurs a complexity cost which depends on the memory length required by her strategy, then every Nash equilibrium must be in Markovian strategies. If, in addition, admissible strategies have uniformly bounded memory, every rationalizable strategy must be Markovian. These results are robust to consi...
-
作者：Myerson, RB
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Scoring rules are compared by their equilibria in simple voting games with Poisson population uncertainty. using new techniques for computing pivot probabilities. Best-rewarding rules like plurality voting can generate discriminatory equilibria where the voters disregard some candidate as not a serious contender, although he may be universally liked, or may be symmetric to other candidates as in the Condorcet cycle. Such discriminatory equilibria are eliminated by worst-punishing rules like ne...
-
作者：Serizawa, S
作者单位：Tohoku University; National University of Singapore
摘要：In his pioneering article, (in Decision and Organization (C. B. McGuire and R. Radner, Eds.), pp. 297-336, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1972) Hurwicz establishes that there is no strategy proof, Pareto-efficient, and individually rational rule for pure exchange economies with two agents and two goods, provided that the domain includes a sufficiently wide class of classical preferences. In this article, we extend his result to pure exchange economies with any finite number of agents and goods. We ...
-
作者：Santos, MS
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper presents some examples of regular dynamic economies with externalities and taxes that either lack existence of a Markov equilibrium or such equilibrium. is not continuous. These examples pose further challenges for the analysis and computation of these economics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C10, C62. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
-
作者：Van Huyck, J; Battalio, R
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：Most learning experiments involve repeated play of exactly the same situation and, hence, can not discriminate between learning to use a deductive principle and other forms of routine learning. In this paper, subjects confront a sequence of similar, but not identical, bargaining games all of which can be solved using the same deductive principles. Conventions based on these deductive principles emerge within 70 periods in 5 of 26 eight-person cohorts. We found no economically significant diffe...
