Self-selection consistent functions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barberà, S; Beviá, C
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2860
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 263-277
• 关键词: social choice rules; allocation consistency; Condorcet criterion; PARTICIPATION

摘要

This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society, The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing efficient allocation consistent rules. We also explore whether such rules may in addition respect the Condorcet criterion. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).