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作者：Safra, Z; Segal, U
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Boston College
摘要：This note shows that M. J. Machina's (1982, Econometrica 50, 277 323) assumption that preferences over lotteries are smooth has some economic implications. We show that Frechet differentiability implies that preferences represent second order risk aversion (as well as conditional second order risk aversion). This implies, among other things, that decision makers buy full insurance only at the absence of marginal loading. We also show that with constant absolute and relative risk aversion, expe...
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作者：Camerer, CF; Ho, TH; Chong, JK
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Pennsylvania; National University of Singapore
摘要：Most learning models assume players are adaptive (i.e., they respond only to their own previous experience and ignore others' payoff information) and behavior is not sensitive to the way in which players are matched. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In this paper, we extend our adaptive experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning model to capture sophisticated learning and strategic teaching in repeated games. The generalized model assumes there is a mixture of adaptive learners and so...
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作者：Austen-Smith, D; Banks, JS; Rustichini, A
作者单位：Northwestern University; California Institute of Technology; Boston University
摘要：This introduction to the JET symposium on political science briefly reviews the main results of the papers in this issue and tries to put them in the context of the current research in political theory. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Norman, P
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：The finite horizon version of D. P. Baron and J. Ferejohn's [1989, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 83, 1181-1206] legislative bargaining model is investigated. With three or more periods, a continuum of divisions is supportable as subgame perfect equilibria. There exist equilibria where coalitions larger than a minimal winning coalition receive strictly positive shares. With sufficiently patient players and a sufficiently long horizon, any interior distribution is supportable as an equilibrium. In cont...
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作者：Bhaskar, V; van Damme, E
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：We clarify the role of mixed strategies and public randomization (sunspots) in sustaining near-efficient outcomes in repeated games with private monitoring. We study a finitely repeated game, where the stage game has multiple equilibria and show that mixed strategies can support partial cooperation, but cannot approximate full cooperation even if monitoring is almost perfect. Efficiency requires extensive form correlation. where strategies can condition upon a sunspot at the end of each period...
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作者：Binmore, K; McCarthy, J; Ponti, G; Samuelson, L; Shaked, A
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London; Universitat d'Alacant; University of Bonn
摘要：This paper reports experiments with one-stage and two-stage alternating-offers bargaining games. Payoff-interdependent preferences have been suggested as an explanation for experimental results that are commonly inconsistent with players' maximizing their monetary payoffs and performing backward induction calculations. We examine whether, given payoff-interdependent preferences, players respect backward induction. To do this, we break backward induction into its components, subgame consistency...
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作者：Goeree, JK; Holt, CA; Palfrey, TR
作者单位：University of Virginia; California Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper applies the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model to study overbidding in private-values auctions. Experimental evidence shows that the prevalence of overbidding depends on the cost of overbidding relative to underbidding, as predicted theoretically. We use QRE as an error structure to estimate parameters of several competing models of overbidding. A QRE model based on risk averse bidders closely tracks the exact distribution of bids. The estimated parameters are significant and ...
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作者：Tröger, T
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：Two bargaining parties play the Nash Demand Game to share a pie whose size is determined by one party's investment decision. Various investment levels are subgame-perfect. Adding the investment decision to Young's evolutionary bargaining model yields the following long-run outcome: efficient investment prevails and the investor's share of the pie approximates die maximum of (i) the smallest share that induces efficient investment, even if the investor expects to appropriate the available pie f...
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作者：Ehlers, L
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Moulin (J. Econ. Theory 84 (1999), 41-72) characterizes the fixed-path rationing methods by efficiency, strategy-proofness, consistency, and resource-monotonicity. In this note we give a straightforward proof of his result. Journal of Economics Literature Classification Numbers: D63, D70. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Gajdos, T; Tallon, JM
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We show that, in a two-period economy with uncertainty in the second period, if an allocation is Pareto optimal for a given set of beliefs and remains optimal when these beliefs are changed, then the set of optimal allocations of the two economies must actually coincide. We identify equivalence classes of beliefs, giving rise to the same set of Pareto optimal allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D51, D61. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
