Prudence, justice, benevolence, and sex: Evidence from similar bargaining games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Van Huyck, J; Battalio, R
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2912
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 227-246
• 关键词: Bargaining; equilibrium selection; learning; evolutionary games; Gender differences

摘要

Most learning experiments involve repeated play of exactly the same situation and, hence, can not discriminate between learning to use a deductive principle and other forms of routine learning. In this paper, subjects confront a sequence of similar, but not identical, bargaining games all of which can be solved using the same deductive principles. Conventions based on these deductive principles emerge within 70 periods in 5 of 26 eight-person cohorts. We found no economically significant differences between all male and all female cohorts. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).