Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Myerson, RB
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2830
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 219-251
• 关键词: plurality; number approval voting; scoring ruled; Poisson game; candidate; serious race

摘要

Scoring rules are compared by their equilibria in simple voting games with Poisson population uncertainty. using new techniques for computing pivot probabilities. Best-rewarding rules like plurality voting can generate discriminatory equilibria where the voters disregard some candidate as not a serious contender, although he may be universally liked, or may be symmetric to other candidates as in the Condorcet cycle. Such discriminatory equilibria are eliminated by worst-punishing rules like negative voting, but then even a universally disliked candidate may have to be taken seriously. In simple bipolar elections, equilibria are always majoritarian and efficient under approval voting, but not other scoring rules. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).