-
作者：Dominguez, Begona
作者单位：University of Auckland
摘要：Benhabib and Rustichini [Optimal taxes without commitment, J. Econ. Theory 77 (1997) 231-259] study the properties of optimal capital taxes in economies without commitment and no government debt. They find that capital taxes may be different from zero at steady state. This note shows that, once governments have the possibility of issuing debt and smoothing taxes over time, optimal steady state capital taxes turn out to be zero. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Dasgupta, Amil
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：What is the effect of offering agents an option to delay their choices in a global coordination game? We address this question by considering a canonical binary action global game, and allowing players to delay their irreversible decisions. Those that delay have access to accurate private information at the second stage, but receive lower payoffs. We show that, as noise vanishes, as long as the benefit to taking the risky action early is greater than the benefit of taking the risky action late...
-
作者：Moller, Marc
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：This paper endogenizes the timing of bilateral contracting between one principal and multiple agents in the presence of externalities. Contracting simultaneously with all agents is optimal for the principal if externalities become weaker the more an agent trades. If instead externalities become stronger, sequential negotiations might benefit the principal as they lower the agents' outside options. Under some linearity conditions, the principal's preferences with respect to different timings of...
-
作者：Karni, Edi
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：This paper states necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence, uniqueness, and updating according to Bayes' rule, of subjective probabilities representing individuals' beliefs. The approach is preference based, and the result is an axiomatic subjective expected utility model of Bayesian decision making under uncertainty with state-dependent preferences. The theory provides foundations for the existence of prior probabilities representing decision makers' beliefs about the likely real...
-
作者：Andolfatto, David; Nosal, Ed; Wallace, Neil
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Simon Fraser University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
摘要：Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent's type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. Via a simple argument, it is shown that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences-and, in particular, for a constrained-efficient ...
-
作者：Schwartz, Thomas
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Several variations and generalizations of the Voting Paradox show that social-preference cycles are not peculiar to majority rule. I offer a new generalization that is demonstrably as general as possible: a relaxation of majority rule is necessary for a cycle of any sort and sufficient for a dominant one-given certain background assumptions, few and familiar. In its Latin square proof as well as its assumptions, the sufficiency theorem directly generalizes both the Voting Paradox and Sen's Lib...
-
作者：Attar, Andrea; Piaser, Gwenael; Porteiro, Nicolas
作者单位：Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Sapienza University Rome; Universidad Pablo de Olavide
摘要：In a recent paper, Peters [Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency, J. Econ. Theory 111 (2003) 189-228] identifies a set of restrictions on players' preferences, called no-externalities assumption, under which, in common agency games, there is no loss of generality in restricting principals' strategies to be take-it or leave-it offers. The present note provides an example to show that these conditions are not sufficient when the agent takes a non-contractible action. (c) 2006 Else...
-
作者：Bade, Sophie; Haeringer, Guillaume; Renou, Ludovic
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Adelaide
摘要：We show in this paper that for the class of two-player games with compact real intervals as strategy spaces and continuous and strictly quasi-concave payoff functions there exists a monotone relation between the size of strategy spaces and the number of Nash equilibria. These sufficient conditions for our theorem to hold are shown to be tight. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Ghiglino, Christian; Venditti, Alain
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Bern; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：We explore the link between wealth inequality, preference heterogeneity and macroeconomic volatility in a two-sector neoclassical growth model. First we prove that, if agents have homogeneous preferences, when the absolute risk tolerance is a strictly convex (concave) function, sufficiently high (low) levels of wealth inequality may lead to endogenous fluctuations in the neighborhood of the steady state. Second, we consider the effects of preference heterogeneity when agents are homogeneous wi...
-
作者：Mandler, Michael
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：We define rationality and equilibrium when states specify agents' actions and agents have arbitrary partitions over these states. Although some suggest that this natural modeling step leads to paradox, we show that Bayesian equilibrium is well defined and puzzles can be circumvented. The main problem arises when player j's partition informs j of i's move and i knows j's strategy. Then i's inference about j's move will vary with i's own move, and i may consequently play a dominated action. Plau...
