The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andolfatto, David; Nosal, Ed; Wallace, Neil
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Simon Fraser University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.11.004
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 709-715
• 关键词: bank run; implementation; sequential service

摘要

Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent's type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. Via a simple argument, it is shown that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences-and, in particular, for a constrained-efficient allocation whether first-best or not. The crucial assumption is independence. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.