The timing of contracting with externalities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moller, Marc
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 484-503
• 关键词: Bilateral contracting; externalities; endogenous timing; EFFICIENCY

摘要

This paper endogenizes the timing of bilateral contracting between one principal and multiple agents in the presence of externalities. Contracting simultaneously with all agents is optimal for the principal if externalities become weaker the more an agent trades. If instead externalities become stronger, sequential negotiations might benefit the principal as they lower the agents' outside options. Under some linearity conditions, the principal's preferences with respect to different timings of contracting are opposed to their efficiency ranking. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.