Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Attar, Andrea; Piaser, Gwenael; Porteiro, Nicolas
• 署名单位: Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Sapienza University Rome; Universidad Pablo de Olavide
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.006
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 590-593
• 关键词: menus; common agency

摘要

In a recent paper, Peters [Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency, J. Econ. Theory 111 (2003) 189-228] identifies a set of restrictions on players' preferences, called no-externalities assumption, under which, in common agency games, there is no loss of generality in restricting principals' strategies to be take-it or leave-it offers. The present note provides an example to show that these conditions are not sufficient when the agent takes a non-contractible action. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.