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作者：Aoyagi, Masaki
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. For independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values, the paper identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion scheme is fully efficient in the sense that the bidders' payoff is close to what they get when the object is allocated to the highest valuation bidder at the reserve price in every period. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Noeldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Bonn
摘要：This paper presents simple sufficient conditions under which optimal bunches in adverse-selection principal-agent problems can be characterized without using optimal control theory. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Basu, Kaushik; Mitra, Tapan
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：A definition of a utilitarian social welfare relation (SWR) for infinite utility streams is proposed. Such a relation is characterized in terms of the Pareto. Anonymity and Partial Unit Comparability Axioms. The merits of the utilitarian SWR, relative to the more restrictive SWR induced by the overtaking criterion, are examined. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kamihigashi, Takashi; Roy, Santanu
作者单位：Kobe University; Southern Methodist University
摘要：This paper analyzes the nature of economic dynamics in a one-sector optimal growth model in which the technology is generally nonconvex, nondifferentiable, and discontinuous. The model also allows for irreversible investment and unbounded growth. We develop various tools to overcome the technical difficulties posed by the generality of the model. We provide sufficient conditions for optimal paths to be bounded, to converge to zero, to be bounded away from zero, and to grow unboundedly. We also...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We study the implementation of efficient behavior in settings with externalities. A planner would like to ensure that a group of agents make socially optimal choices, but he only has limited information about the agents' preferences, and can only distinguish individual agents through the actions they choose. We describe the agents' behavior using a stochastic evolutionary model, assuming that their choice probabilities are given by the logit choice rule. We prove that there is a simple price s...
