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作者：Bester, Helmut; Strausz, Roland
作者单位：Free University of Berlin
摘要：This paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal-agent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment. By allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature's common, but overly restrictive focus on one-shot, direct communication. In addition, general communication devices solve two fundamental problems of contracting with imperfect commitment: First, they allow us to identify the 'local downward' incentive constraints as the relevant ...
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作者：Hu, Tai-Wei
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This paper shows that common P-belief of rationality implies p-rationalizability for games with compact strategy sets. We also establish the Bayesian foundation for the perfect p-rationalizability for finite games. The p-rationalizability is then used to analyze the robustness of rationalizable sets. For any game with compact strategy sets, we show that the rationalizable set is robust, i.e., the strategies characterized by common p-belief of rationality are close to the rationalizable set whe...
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作者：van den Brink, Rene
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：A famous solution for cooperative tran, ferable utility gatnes is the Shapley value. Most axiomatic characterizations of this value use some axiom related to null players, i.e. players who contribute zero to any coalition. We show that replacing null players with nullifying players characterizes the equal division solution distributing the worth of the 'grand coalition' equally among all players. A player is nullibing if every coalition containing this player earns zero worth. Using invariance...
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作者：Kremer, Ilan; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We consider the effects a public revelation of information (e.g. rating, grade) has on trading in a dynamic signaling model. Competing buyers offer prices to a privately informed seller who can reject them and delay trade. Delay is costly and the seller has no commitment to its duration. The external public information allows for signaling in equilibrium. More interestingly, we characterize the dynamics of trade and prices. If signals are noisy, no trade takes place just before the revelation ...
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作者：Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Two discrete time tatonnement processes-one featuring successive tatonnement, the other featuring simultaneous tatonnernent-for the core of coalitional games with transferable utility are introduced. For totally balanced games, the successive core tatonnement process corresponds to the standard simultaneous price tatonnement process of competitive equilibrium theory via the Shapley-Shubik (market game-direct market) correspondence. The simultaneous core tatonnement process is based entirely on...
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作者：Rauh, Michael T.
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We develop an equilibrium sequential search model which includes most of the literature as special cases. In particular, the model can accommodate heterogeneity in buyers' search costs and demand functions and firms' cost functions, with general demand and cost functions. We identify conditions which ensure existence of equilibrium in pure strategies, utilizing recent progress in the theory of large games by Khan and Sun. These conditions elucidate the essential structure of equilibrium search...
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作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil I.; Smorodinsky, Rann
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Northwestern University
摘要：We consider the efficiency properties of exchange economies where privately informed traders behave strategically. Specifically, a competitive mechanism is any mapping of traders' reports about their types to an equilibrium price vector and allocation of the reported economy. In our model, some traders may have non-vanishing impact on prices and allocations regardless of the size of the economy. Although truthful reporting by all traders cannot be achieved, we show that, given any desired leve...
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作者：Echenique, Federico
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：I present a simple and fast algorithm that finds all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with strategic complementarities. This is the first non-trivial algorithm for finding all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Macho-Stadler, Ines; Perez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities when forming the grand coalition is efficient. We show that any sharing rule satisfying efficiency, linearity, dummy player and a strong symmetry axioms can be obtained through an a...
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作者：Cremer, Jacques; Spiegel, Yossi; Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
作者单位：Northwestern University; Universite de Toulouse; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. With independent bidders' types and possibly interdependent valuations, the seller's problem can be reduced to a search problem in which the surplus is measured in terms of virtual utilities minus search costs. Compared to the socially efficient mechanism, the optimal mechanism features fewer participants, long...
