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作者：Ray, Debraj
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This article introduces the symposium on economic development theory. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sveen, Tommy; Weinke, Lutz
作者单位：Norges Bank; Duke University
摘要：In the presence of firm-specific capital the Taylor principle can generate multiple equilibria. Sveen and Weinke [New perspectives on capital, sticky prices, and the Taylor principle, J. Econ. Theory 123 (2005) 21-39] obtain that result in the context of a Calvo-style sticky price model. One potential criticism is that the price stickiness which is needed for our theoretical result to be relevant from a practical point of view is somewhat to the high part of available empirical estimates. In t...
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作者：Landsberger, Michael
作者单位：University of Haifa
摘要：Participation in economic games such as auctions is typically costly, which means that players (potential bidders) must consider whether to participate. Such decisions may be no less crucial than how to bid, and yet the literature has been mostly concerned with bidding, assuming an exogenously given number of bidders; see Krishna [Auction Theory, Academic Press, New York, 2002]. Landsberger and Tsirelson [Correlated signals against monotone equilibria, preprint SSRN 222308, Social Science Rese...
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作者：Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv
作者单位：Brown University; Brown University
摘要：A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience. Since information transmission is implicit in the Bayesian equilibria of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which the transmission of information among members ...
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作者：Myerson, Roger B.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：The core is extended to games with incomplete information. The feasible set is characterized by incentive-compatible mechanisms. Blocking is organized at the interim stage by an incentive-compatible mediation plan. Membership of the blocking coalition itself may be determined randomly by the blocking mediator. Nonemptiness of an interim fine core is proven for games with a balanced structure, independent types, and sidepayments. An offer of severance payments may be needed to inhibit blocking....
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作者：Khalil, Fahad; Martimort, David; Parigi, Bruno
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Universite de Toulouse; University of Padua
摘要：Multiple principals want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts noncooperatively. The degree of coordination between principals shapes the contracts and affects the amount of monitoring. Equity-like contracts and excessive monitoring emerge when principals coordinate or verify each other's monitoring efforts. When this is not possible, free riding weakens monitoring incentives, so that flat payments, debt-like contracts, and very low levels of monitoring ap...
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作者：Laruelle, Annick; Valenciano, Federico
作者单位：University of Basque Country; Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：This paper addresses the following issue: if a set of agents bargain on a set of feasible alternatives `in the shadow' of a voting rule, that is, any agreement can be enforced if a 'winning coalition' supports it, what general agreements are likely to arise? In other words: what influence can the voting rule used to settle (possibly nonunanimous) agreements have on the outcome of consensus? We model the situation as an extension of the Nash bargaining problem in which an arbitrary voting rule ...
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作者：Zhao, Rui R.
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：A group of risk-averse agents repeatedly produce a perishable consumption good; individual outputs are observable but efforts are not. The contracting problem admits a recursive formulation, and the optimal value function is the fixed point of a contraction mapping. When the agents can be punished to the full extent in a single period, every continuation contract of an optimal contract is itself optimal; the marginal utility ratio between one agent and another is a submartingale. The results i...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Ray, Debraj; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：New York University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：A model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be chosen. While agents differ in their preferences over alternatives, everybody prefers agreement to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features: private information regarding valuations, differing intensities in preferences, and the option to declare neutrality to avoid disagreement. There is always an equilibrium in which the majority is more aggressive in pushing its alternative, thus enforcin...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Harvard University
摘要：We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with almost public information. The results generalize to the n-person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain equilibria by comparing the reports of different players, and using these third parties to effectively enforce contracts. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
