Strategies as states

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mandler, Michael
• 署名单位: University of London; Royal Holloway University London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.10.007
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 105-130
• 关键词: Bayesian decision theory; interactive epistemology; Newcomb's paradox; causal decision theory

摘要

We define rationality and equilibrium when states specify agents' actions and agents have arbitrary partitions over these states. Although some suggest that this natural modeling step leads to paradox, we show that Bayesian equilibrium is well defined and puzzles can be circumvented. The main problem arises when player j's partition informs j of i's move and i knows j's strategy. Then i's inference about j's move will vary with i's own move, and i may consequently play a dominated action. Plausible conditions on partitions rule out these scenarios. Equilibria exist under the same conditions, and more generally epsilon equilibria usually exist. (c) 2006 Published by Elsevier Inc.