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作者：Cripps, Martin W.; Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps et al. [Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations, Econometrica 72 (2004) 407-432] showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends that result to games in which the uninformed player is long-lived and has priv...
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作者：Koeppl, Thorsten V.
作者单位：Queens University - Canada
摘要：Societies provide institutions that are costly to set up, but able to enforce long-run relationships. We study the optimal decision problem of using self-governance for risk sharing or governance through enforcement provided by these institutions. Third-party enforcement is modelled as a costly technology that consumes resources, but permits the punishment of agents who deviate from ex ante specified allocations. We show that it is optimal to employ the technology whenever commitment problems ...
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作者：Mukherji, Anjan
作者单位：Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
摘要：It is well known that global stability of competitive equilibrium obtains only under quite stringent restrictions. This paper identifies a set of restrictions which may be interpreted as a very weak form of the so-called Law of Demand and shows how this may imply global stability for motion on the plane. It is also of some interest that this condition is satisfied by a perturbed version of the celebrated Scarf example which does not satisfy existing conditions for global stability. (c) 2006 El...
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作者：Van Zandt, Timothy; Vives, Xavier
摘要：For Bayesian games of strategic complementarities, we provide a constructive proof of the existence of a greatest and a least Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each one in strategies that are monotone in type. Our main assumptions, besides strategic complementarities, are that each player's payoff displays increasing differences in own action and the profile of types and that each player's interim beliefs are increasing in type with respect to first-order stochastic dominance (e.g., types are affilia...
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作者：Chakraborty, Archishman; Harbaugh, Rick
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：When are comparative statements credible? We show that simple complementarity conditions ensure that an expert with private information about multiple issues can credibly rank the issues for a decision maker. By restricting the expert's ability to exaggerate, multidimensional cheap talk of this form permits communication when it would not be credible in a single dimension. The communication gains can be substantial with even a couple of dimensions, and the complete ranking is asymptotically eq...
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作者：Slikker, Marco
作者单位：Eindhoven University of Technology
摘要：In this paper we study non-cooperative foundations of network allocation rules. We focus on three allocation rules: the Myerson value, the position value and the component-wise egalitarian solution. For any of these three rules we provide a characterization based on component efficiency and some balanced contribution property. Additionally, we present three mechanisms whose equilibrium payoffs are well defined and coincide with the three rules under consideration if the underlying value functi...
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作者：Kim, Jaehoon; Fey, Mark
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：We analyze voting behavior in a large electorate in which voters have adversarial state-contingent preferences with incomplete information about the state of the world. We show that one type of voter can suffer from the swing voter's curse a la Feddersen and Pesendorfer [The swing voter's curse, Amer. Econ. Rev. 86 (1996) 408-424], and go on to characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of this model under different parameter values. We prove that unlike settings with nonadversarial preference...
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作者：Lee, Jihong; Sabourian, Hamid
作者单位：University of London; University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper, by introducing complexity considerations, provides a dynamic foundation for the Coase theorem and highlights the role of transaction costs in generating inefficient bargaining/negotiation outcomes. We show, when the players have a preference for less complex strategies, the Coase theorem holds in negotiation models with repeated surplus and endogenous disagreement payoffs if and only if there are no transaction costs. Specifically, complexity considerations select only efficient eq...
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作者：Gerardi, Dino; Yariv, Leeat
作者单位：Yale University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We analyze a model of jury decision making in which jurors deliberate before casting their votes. We consider a wide range of voting institutions and show that deliberations render these equivalent with respect to the sequential equilibrium outcomes they generate. In particular, in the context of a jury setup, all voting rules excluding the two types of unanimity rules (one requiring a unanimous consensus to acquit, one requiring a unanimous consensus to convict) induce the same set of equilib...
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz; Moldovanu, Benny
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any ...
