A procedural condition necessary and sufficient for cyclic social preference

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schwartz, Thomas
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 688-695
• 关键词: Social choice; cycles; voting paradox; Impossibility theorems; Condorcet; Liberal paradox

摘要

Several variations and generalizations of the Voting Paradox show that social-preference cycles are not peculiar to majority rule. I offer a new generalization that is demonstrably as general as possible: a relaxation of majority rule is necessary for a cycle of any sort and sufficient for a dominant one-given certain background assumptions, few and familiar. In its Latin square proof as well as its assumptions, the sufficiency theorem directly generalizes both the Voting Paradox and Sen's Liberal Paradox. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.