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作者：Hassler, John; Storesletten, Kjetil; Zilibotti, Fabrizio
作者单位：University of Oslo; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Stockholm University
摘要：This paper analyzes an overlapping generation model of redistribution and public good provision under repeated voting. Expenditures are financed through age-dependent taxation that distorts human capital investment. Taxes redistribute income both across skill groups and across generations. We focus on politico-economic Markov equilibria and contrast these with the Ramsey allocation under commitment. The model features indeterminate equilibria, with a key role of forward-looking strategic votin...
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作者：Kvasov, Dmitriy
作者单位：University of Auckland
摘要：Many interesting phenomena (electoral competition, R&D races, lobbying) are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources. Specifically, the following game is analyzed. Two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests. The players have limited resources (budgets) and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests. In each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize. Mixed-strat...
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作者：Wakai, Katsutoshi
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY
摘要：This note fills a gap in the proof of recursive multiple-priors utility [L. Epstein, M. Schneider, Recursive multiple priors, J. Econ. Theory 113 (2003) 1-31]. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sun, Yeneng; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
摘要：The idea of perfect competition for an economy with asymmetric information is formalized via an idiosyncratic signal process in which the private signals of almost every individual agent can influence only a negligible group of agents, and the individual agents' relevant signals are essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the true states of nature. Thus, there is no incentive for an individual agent to manipulate her private information. The existence of incentive compatible, ex post W...
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作者：d'Albis, Hippolyte
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：This paper develops an overlapping-generations (OLG) model to analyze the consequences of demographic structure changes induced by an exogenous shift in the birth rate. We first show that a finite growth rate of the population that maximizes long-run capital per capita exists. Then, we examine the theoretical properties of this growth rate by showing that: (i) it corresponds to the demographic structure such that the average ages of capital holders and workers are equal; (ii) it is associated ...
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作者：Espino, Emilio
作者单位：Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
摘要：This paper studies equilibrium portfolios in the standard neoclassical growth model under uncertainty with heterogeneous agents and dynamically complete markets. Preferences are purposely restricted to be quasi-homothetic. The main source of heterogeneity across agents is due to different endowments of shares of the representative firm at date 0. Fixing portfolios is the optimal equilibrium strategy in stationary endowment economies with dynamically complete markets. However, when the environm...
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作者：Kultti, Klaus; Vartiainen, Hannu
作者单位：University of Helsinki
摘要：We establish a link between von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set and the Nash solution in a general n-player utility set. The stable set-solution is defined with respect to a dominance relation: payoff vector u dominates v if one player prefers u even with one period delay. We show that a stable set exists and, if the utility set has a smooth surface, any stable set converges to the Nash bargaining solution when the length of the period goes to zero. (c) 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Segal, Ilya
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：The paper examines the communication requirements of social choice rules when the (sincere) agents privately know their preferences. It shows that for a large class of choice rules, any minimally informative way to verify that a given alternative is in the choice rule is by verifying a budget equilibrium, i.e., that the alternative is optimal to each agent within a budget set given to him. Therefore, any communication mechanism realizing the choice rule must find a supporting budget equilibriu...
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作者：Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; Ok, Efe A.
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; New York University
摘要：A major problem of the positive theory of income taxation is to explain why statutory income tax schedules in practice are marginal-rate progressive. While it is commonly believed that this is but a simple consequence of the fact that the number of relatively poor voters exceeds that of richer voters in general, putting this contention in a voting equilibrium context is not a trivial task. We do this here in the context of nonlinear taxation and attempt to provide a formal argument in support ...
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作者：Lloyd-Braga, Teresa; Nourry, Carine; Venditti, Alain
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：We consider an aggregate two-periods overlapping generations model with endogenous labor, consumption in both periods of life, homothetic preferences and productive external effects coming from the average capital and labor. We show that under realistic calibrations of the parameters, in particular a large enough share of first period consumption over the wage income, local indeterminacy of equilibria cannot occur with capital externalities alone. It can nevertheless occur when there are only,...
