More strategies, more Nash equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bade, Sophie; Haeringer, Guillaume; Renou, Ludovic
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Adelaide
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.009
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 551-557
• 关键词: strategic-form games; strategy spaces; Nash equilibrium; number of Nash equilibria

摘要

We show in this paper that for the class of two-player games with compact real intervals as strategy spaces and continuous and strictly quasi-concave payoff functions there exists a monotone relation between the size of strategy spaces and the number of Nash equilibria. These sufficient conditions for our theorem to hold are shown to be tight. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.