Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bond, Philip; Gomes, Armando
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.008
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 175-211
• 关键词: Multitasking; first-order approach; Log-concavity; Polya frequency sequence; fragility

摘要

We analyze a tractable class of multitask principal-agent problems, such as the one faced by a firm with a manager overseeing several projects. We allow for tasks to be complements or substitutes. We avoid the problems associated with the first-order approach by directly characterizing the shape of the agent's indirect utility function, which exhibits a convex then concave shape in effort. We identify a new source of allocational inefficiency across tasks: excessive concentration, and its consequence, insufficient risk taking. Optimal incentive schemes in our environment are generally fragile: small changes in fundamentals can cause the agent's effort to collapse. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.