Folk theorem with communication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Obara, Ichiro
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.08.005
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 120-134
• 关键词: communication; folk theorem; private monitoring; repeated games

摘要

This paper proves a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and communication, extending the idea of delayed communication in Compte [O. Compte, Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, Econometrica 66 (1998) 597-626] to the case where private signals are correlated. The sufficient condition for the folk theorem is generically satisfied with more than two players, even when other well-known conditions are not. The folk theorem also applies to some two-players repeated games. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.