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作者：Hagedorn, Marcus
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：An auctioneer wants to sell an indivisible object to one of multiple bidders, who have private information about their valuations of the object. A bidder's information structure determines the accuracy with which the bidder knows her private valuation. The main result of the paper is that the auctioneer's revenue is a convex function of bidders' information structures. One implication is that assigning asymmetric information structures instead of symmetric information structures to bidders is ...
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作者：Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Nakamura, Toshifumi
作者单位：Harvard University; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Bank of Japan
摘要：We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in [B. Klaus, F. Klijn, Stable matchings and preferences of couples, J. Econ. Theory 121 (2005) 75-106] or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings [KK05, Theorem 3.3] and a maximal domain result [KK05, Theorem 3.5] are adjusted accordingly. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Adao, Bernardino; Correia, Isabel; Teles, Pedro
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper assesses the relevance of the exchange rate regime for stabilization policy. Using both fiscal and monetary policy, we conclude that the exchange rate regime is irrelevant. This is the case independently of the severity of price rigidities, independently of asymmetries across countries in shocks and transmission mechanisms. The only relevant conditions are on the mobility of labor and financial assets. The results can be summarized with the claim that every currency area is an optim...
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作者：Bade, Sophie; Haeringer, Guillaume; Renou, Ludovic
作者单位：University of Leicester; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to gradually and Unilaterally rule out some of their actions. Formally, we embed a strategic-form game into a multi-stage game, in which players can restrict their action spaces in all but the final stage, and select among the remaining actions in the last stage. We say that an action profile is implementable by commitment if this action profile is played in the last stage of a subgame-perfect equilibrium path. We pro...
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作者：Aoyagi, Masaki; Frechette, Guillaume
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This paper uses laboratory experiments to test the implications of the theory of repeated games on equilibrium payoffs and estimate strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring. We find that subjects' payoffs (i) decrease as noise increases, and (ii) are lower than the theoretical maximum for low noise, but exceed it for high noise. Under the assumption that the subjects' strategy uses thresholds on the public signal for transition between coope...
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作者：Ergin, Haluk; Gul, Faruk
作者单位：Princeton University; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We develop a Savage-type model of choice under uncertainty in which agents identify uncertain prospects with subjective compound lotteries. Our theory permits issue preference; that is, agents may not be indifferent among gambles that yield the same probability distribution if they depend on different issues. Hence, we establish subjective foundations for the Anscombe-Aumann framework and other models with two different types of probabilities. We define second-order risk as risk that resolves ...
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作者：Hill, Brian
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：Whether a preference relation can be represented using state-independent utilities as opposed to state-dependent utilities may depend on which acts count as constant acts. This observation underlies an extension of Savage's expected utility theory to the state-dependent case that was proposed in this journal by Edi Kami. His result contains a condition requiring the existence of a set of acts which can play the role of constant acts and support a representation involving a state-independent ut...
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作者：Pavan, Alessandro; Calzolari, Giacomo
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Bologna
摘要：This paper considers dynamic games in which multiple principals contract sequentially and noncooperatively with the same agent. We first show that when contracting is private, i.e. when downstream principals do not observe the mechanisms offered upstream and the decisions taken in these mechanisms, all PBE outcomes can be characterized through pure-strategy profiles in which the principals offer menus of contracts and delegate to the agent the choice of the contractual terms. We then show that...
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作者：Yamamoto, Yuichi
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：The present paper studies repeated games with private monitoring, and characterizes the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in the limit as the discount factor approaches one and the noise on private information vanishes. Contrary to the conjecture by Ely et al. [J.C. Ely, J. Mmer, W. Olszewski, Belief-free equilibria in repeated games, Econometrica 73 (2005) 377-415], the equilibrium payoff set is computed by the same formula, no matter how many players there are. As an application of this...
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作者：Forges, Francoise; Minelli, Enrico
作者单位：University of Brescia; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：Afriat proved the equivalence of a variant of the strong axiom of revealed preference and the existence of a solution to a set of linear inequalities. From this solution he constructed a utility function rationalizing the choices of a competitive consumer. We extend Afriat's theorem to a class of nonlinear, nonconvex budget sets. We thereby obtain testable implications of rational behavior for a wide class of economic environments, and a constructive method to derive individual preferences fro...
