Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chiesa, Gabriella; Denicolo, Vincenzo
• 署名单位: University of Bologna
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.005
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 296-311
• 关键词: Common agency; Supply schedules; truthful equilibrium; Minimum rent equilibrium

摘要

We analyze an abstract model of trading where N principals submit quantity-payment schedules that describe the contracts they offer to an agent, and the agent then chooses how much to trade with every principal. This represents a special class of common agency games with complete information. We study all the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of these games, not only truthful ones, providing a complete characterization of equilibrium payoffs. In particular, we show that the equilibrium that is Pareto-dominant for the principals is not truthful when there are more than two of them. We also provide a partial characterization of equilibrium strategies. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.