A theory of political cycles

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Martinez, Leonardo
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.10.006
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1166-1186
• 关键词: Political cycles; career concerns; reputation; AGENCY; dynamic games; ELECTIONS

摘要

We study how the proximity of elections affects policy choices in a model in which policymakers want to improve their reputation to increase their reelection chances. Policymakers' equilibrium decisions depend on both their reputation and the proximity of the next election. Typically, incentives to influence election results are stronger closer to the election (for a given reputation level), as argued in the political cycles literature, and these political cycles are less important when the policymaker's reputation is better. Our analysis sheds light on other agency relationships in which part of the compensation is decided upon infrequently. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.