Correlated Nash equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lo, Kin Chung
• 署名单位: York University - Canada
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.006
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 722-743
• 关键词: Agreeing to disagree; ambiguity; correlated equilibrium; Epistemic conditions; Knightian uncertainty; maxmin expected utility; multiple priors; Nash equilibrium; Stochastic independence

摘要

We modify the epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium only to accommodate Gilboa and Schmeidler's [I. Gilboa, D. Schmeidler, Maxmin expected utility with nonunique prior, J. Math. Econ. 18 (1989) 141-153] maxmin expected utility preferences, and identify the equilibrium concept in n-player strategic games that characterizes the modified epistemic conditions. The epistemic characterization supports the equilibrium concept as a minimal generalization of Nash equilibrium, in the sense that it deviates from Nash equilibrium only in terms of players' attitude towards ambiguity. Consequently, comparing it with Nash equilibrium constitutes a ceteris paribus study of the effects of ambiguity on how a game is played. For example, with ambiguity, (beliefs about) action choices are in general correlated. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All fights reserved.