The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McQuillin, Ben
• 署名单位: University of East Anglia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.010
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 696-721
• 关键词: Coalition structure; externalities; Partition function games; Recursion; Shapley value

摘要

The Shapley value assigns, to each game that is adequately represented by its characteristic function, an outcome for each player. An elaboration on the Shapley value that assigns, to characteristic function games, a partition function outcome is broadly established and accepted, but elaborations to encompass games with externalities (represented by partition functions) are not. Here, I show that simultaneous consideration of the two elaborations (generalization and extension) obtains a unique Shapley-type value for games in partition function form. The key requirement is that the Extended, Generalized Shapley Value (EGSV) should be recursive: the EGSV of any game should be the EGSV of itself. This requirement forces us to ignore all but the payoffs to bilateral partitions. The EGSV can be conceptualized as the ex ante value of a process of successive bilateral amalgamations. Previous Shapley value extensions, if generalized, are not recursive; indeed, they iterate to the EGSV. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.