Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier
• 署名单位: Hitotsubashi University; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.03.001
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1726-1769
• 关键词: Equilibrium selection; Robustness; incomplete information; perfect foresight dynamics; Iteration; monotone potential; p-Dominance

摘要

For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper applies such a procedure to define the concept of iterated monotone potential maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer). It is shown that under some monotonicity conditions, an iterated MP-maximizer is robust to incomplete information [A. Kajii, S. Morris, The robustness of equilibria to incomplete information, Econometrica 65 (1997) 1283-1309] and absorbing and globally accessible under perfect foresight dynamics for a small friction [A. Matsui, K. Matsuyama, An approach to equilibrium selection, J. Econ. Theory 65 (1995) 415-434]. Several simple sufficient conditions under which a game has an iterated MP-maximizer are also provided. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.