Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Milgrom, Paul; Strulovici, Bruno
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.002
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 212-247
• 关键词: Gross substitutes; Tatonnement; Pseudo-equilibrium; Law of aggregate demand

摘要

This paper identifies two notions of substitutes for auction and equilibrium analysis. Weak substitutes, the usual price-theory notion, guarantees monotonicity of tatonnement processes and convergence of clock auctions to a pseudo-equilibrium, but only strong substitutes, which treats each unit traded as a distinct good with its own price, guarantees that every pseudo-equilibrium is a Walrasian equilibrium, that the Vickrey outcome is in the core, and that the law of aggregate demand is satisfied. When goods are divisible, weak substitutes along with concavity guarantees all of the above properties, except for the law of aggregate demand. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.