Theories of coalitional rationality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ambrus, Attila
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.03.010
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 676-695
• 关键词: Normal form games; Coalitional agreements; COORDINATION; Epistemic foundations of solution concepts

摘要

This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal form games. The (best) response of a coalition is defined to be an operator from sets of conjectures to sets of strategies. A strategy is epistemic coalitionally rationalizable if it is consistent with rationality and common certainty that every coalition is rational. A characterization of this solution set is provided for operators satisfying four basic properties. Special attention is devoted to an operator that leads to a solution concept that is generically equivalent to the iteratively defined concept of coalitional rationalizability. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.