Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kovac, Eugen; Mylovanov, Tymofiy
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.008
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1373-1395
• 关键词: Optimal delegation; cheap talk; principal-agent relationship; No monetary transfers; Stochastic mechanisms

摘要

We analyze relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in an environment that has been extensively studied in the literature on communication (e.g., [Vincent R Crawford, Joel Sobel, Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50 (6) (1982) 1431-1451]) and optimal delegation (e.g., [Bengt Holmstrom, On the theory of delegation, in: M. Boyer, R.E. Kihlstrom (Eds.), Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, North-Holland, 1984, pp. 115-141]): a principal-agent model with hidden information, no monetary transfers, and single-peaked preferences. We demonstrate that under the common assumption of quadratic payoffs and a certain regularity condition on the distribution of private information and the agent's bias, the optimal mechanism is deterministic. We also provide an explicit characterization of this mechanism. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.