Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fudenberg, Drew; He, Kevin
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105238
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Non-equilibrium learning; Equilibrium refinements; trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; Weighted fictitious play

摘要

Player-Compatible Equilibrium (PCE) imposes cross-player restrictions on the magnitudes of the players' trembles onto different strategies. These restrictions capture the idea that trembles correspond to deliberate experiments by agents who are unsure of the prevailing distribution of play. PCE selects intuitive equilibria in a number of examples where trembling-hand perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975) and proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978) have no bite. We show that rational learning and weighted fictitious play imply our compatibility restrictions in a steady-state setting. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.