Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lu, Jingfeng; Wang, Zijia
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; Renmin University of China
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105307
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Dynamic mechanism design; outside option; Price search; Price matching; Search deterrence

摘要

We study optimal dynamic selling mechanisms in a two-stage model where the buyer can search for a better price at the second stage. When this outside price is public, the optimal selling mechanism takes the form of a fixed first-stage price with price matching in the second stage. In contrast, when the outside price is the buyer's private information, the optimal mechanism is a menu of two contracts: a first-stage sale at a higher price with immediate delivery, or a first-stage sale at a lower price with second-stage delivery. Thus the optimal form of search deterrence depends on the observability of the buyer's outside option. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.