Consistent rights on property spaces

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kretz, Claudio
• 署名单位: Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105323
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Expert rights; Liberal rights; Liberal paradox; Judgment aggregation; General aggregation theory; Effectivity function

摘要

In many aggregation problems, subgroups of agents have the right to predetermine certain properties of the aggregate. Yet, such rights may be inconsistent. In preference aggregation, for example, the 'liberal paradox' refers to the incompatibility of minimal liberal rights with the Pareto principle (a right to society as a whole). We show that, in general, rights to properties are consistent if and only if the following simple condition holds. Whenever rights are given to a critical (i.e., minimally inconsistent) combination of properties, the respective rights holding groups must intersect to at least one common member. Rights are consistent with monotone independent aggregation (voting by properties) if and only if this condition holds under a suitable generalization of criticality. Our property formulation allows us to study a wide range of applications in social choice and judgment aggregation theory. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.