A noncooperative foundation of the competitive divisions for bads

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mariotti, Marco; Wen, Quan
• 署名单位: University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105253
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Competitive division; Mixed manna; Markov perfect equilibrium

摘要

Many economic situations involve the division of bads. We study a noncooperative game model for this type of division problem. The game resembles a standard multilateral bargaining model, but in our case, perpetual disagreement is not a feasible outcome. The driving feature of the model is that a player that makes an unacceptable proposal (causing breakdown with some probability) is made to internalize all the costs in case of breakdown. We show that as the probability of exogenous breakdown goes to zero, this game implements some competitive divisionsin Markov perfect equilibria: the limit of any convergent sequence of equilibrium outcomes is a competitive division, but a competitive division may not be a limit of the equilibrium outcomes. Published by Elsevier Inc.