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作者：Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the individually-rationalcore (IR-core) whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their endowments. We show that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness, then for any problem for which the IR-core is n...
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作者：Latzer, Helene
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University Saint-Louis - Bruxelles
摘要：This paper introduces multi-quality firms within a Schumpeterian framework. Featuring non-homothetic preferences and income disparities in an otherwise standard quality-ladder model, it shows that the resulting differences in the willingness to pay for quality among consumers generate both positive investments in R&D by industry leaders and positive market shares for more than one quality, hence allowing for the emergence of multi-product firms within a vertical innovation framework. This posi...
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作者：Dybvig, Philip; Liu, Fang
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We extend Cass and Stiglitz's analysis of preference-based mutual fund separation. We provide a complete characterization of the general K-fund separation. We show that some instances of separation with many funds can be constructed by adding inverse marginal utility functions having separation with one or a few funds. We also show that there is money separation (in which we can choose the riskless asset as one of the funds) if and only if there is a fund (which may or may not be the riskless ...
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作者：Casajus, Andre
作者单位：HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
摘要：We pinpoint the position of the (symmetric) Shapley value within the class of positively weighted Shapley value to their treatment of symmetric versus mutually dependent players. While symmetric players are equally productive, mutually dependent players are only jointly (hence, equally) productive. In particular, we provide a characterization of the whole class of positively weighted Shapley values that uses two standard properties, efficiency and the null player out property, and a new proper...
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作者：Baranov, Oleg
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：Known dynamic implementations of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism in general private-value auction settings utilize non-linear (not additively-separable over goods) and non-anonymous (bidder-specific) prices. The need for non-linear and non-anonymous prices - a complication that is often difficult to implement in practice - arises from limiting attention to elicitation processes based on demand queries (i.e., asking bidders to report their demands at posted prices). In this paper, we relax ...
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作者：Safronov, Mikhail
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and d'Aspremont-Gerard-Varet mechanisms implement efficient social choice by compensating each agent for the externalities that his report imposes on all other agents. Instead of aggregate compensations, which may lead to profitable coalitional deviations, this paper provides an alternative mechanism, in which each pair of agents directly compensate each other for the pairwise externalities they impose. Under the assumption of independent private values, any agent is ...
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作者：Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.; Sachdeva, Ashish
作者单位：University of Southern California; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National University of Singapore
摘要：We study in the laboratory three-, four- and six-player, dominance solvable games of complete information. We consider sequential and simultaneous versions of games that have the same, unique Nash equilibrium, and we use mousetracking to understand the decision making process of subjects. We find more equilibrium choices in the sequential version than in the simultaneous version of the game and we highlight the importance of attentional measures. Indeed, depending on the treatment, equilibrium...
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作者：Kendall, Chad
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：I model a financial market in which traders acquire private information through time-consuming research. A time cost of information arises due to competition - through the expected adverse price movements due to others' trades - causing traders to rush to trade on weak information. This cost monotonically increases with asset value uncertainty, so that, exactly opposite to the result under the standard modeling assumption of a monetary cost of information, traders acquire the least information...
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作者：Khan, Urmee; Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Respect for first order distributional overtaking guarantees that social welfare functions for intergenerational problems treat present and future people equally and respect the Pareto criterion, modulo null sets. For weakly ergodic optimization problems, this class of social welfare functions yields solutions that respect welfare concerns, sharply contrasting with extant patient criteria. For problems in which the evolution of future paths hinges on early events and decisions, the curvature o...
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作者：Kojima, Fuhito; Tamura, Akihisa; Yokoo, Makoto
作者单位：Stanford University; Keio University; Kyushu University
摘要：We consider two-sided matching problems where agents on one side of the market (hospitals) are required to satisfy certain distributional constraints. We show that when the preferences and constraints of the hospitals can be represented by an M-(sic)-concave function, (i) the generalized Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism is strategyproof for doctors, (ii) it produces the doctor-optimal stable matching, and (iii) its time complexity is proportional to the square of the number of possible contr...
