Coalition-proof full efficient implementation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Safronov, Mikhail
• 署名单位: University of Cambridge
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.009
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 659-677
• 关键词: Mechanism design; Internalizing externalities; Coalition-proofness; full implementation

摘要

The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and d'Aspremont-Gerard-Varet mechanisms implement efficient social choice by compensating each agent for the externalities that his report imposes on all other agents. Instead of aggregate compensations, which may lead to profitable coalitional deviations, this paper provides an alternative mechanism, in which each pair of agents directly compensate each other for the pairwise externalities they impose. Under the assumption of independent private values, any agent is guaranteed to receive his ex ante efficient payoff by reporting truthfully, regardless of others' strategies. This absence of ex ante externalities makes the mechanism coalition-proof, and makes all equilibria efficient. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.