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作者：Papageorgiou, Theodore
作者单位：McGill University
摘要：This paper considers the equilibrium interaction between within firm and across firm reallocation in the presence of labor market frictions. While a sizable literature has investigated frictional labor markets, it has ignored within firm mobility. Nonetheless, every year a sizable fraction of workers switch occupations without changing firms. Employees in large firms can sample from a larger selection and across firm mobility is replaced by within firm mobility. Bringing together within and ac...
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作者：Araujo, Luis; Hu, Tai-Wei
作者单位：Michigan State University; Getulio Vargas Foundation; University of Bristol
摘要：We characterize optimal credit market interventions with respect to two fundamental frictions limited commitment and limited monitoring. We consider two classes of interventions: an inflationary policy which uses inflation tax to forgive private debt, and a deflationary policy which uses credit tax to increase the real rate of return on money. We show that both money and debt are essential and that intervention is generically optimal. The nature of the optimal intervention depends on the funda...
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作者：Tomura, Hajime
作者单位：Waseda University
摘要：This paper presents a three-period model to analyze why banks need bank reserves despite the presence of other liquid assets, such as Treasury securities. The model shows that if a pair of banks settle bank transfers between them without the central bank, a hold-up problem occurs when they bargain over the terms of settlement. This result stems from the confidentiality of bank-transfer requests, which makes it necessary for a depositor to retain an outside option to withdraw cash to enforce a ...
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作者：Tsai, Jerry; Wachter, Jessica A.
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We solve for asset prices in a general affine representative-agent economy with isoelastic recursive utility and rare events. Our novel solution method is exact in two special cases: no preference for early resolution of uncertainty and elasticity of intertemporal substitution equal to one. Our results clarify model properties governed by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, by risk aversion, and by the preference for early resolution of uncertainty. Finally, we show in a general sett...
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作者：Escobar, Juan F.; Llanes, Gaston
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：We study cooperation dynamics in repeated games with Markovian private information. After any history, signaling reveals information that helps players coordinate their future actions, but also makes the problem of coordinating current actions harder. In equilibrium, players may play aggressive or uncooperative actions that signal private information and partners tolerate a certain number of such actions. We discuss several applications of our results: We explain the cycles of cooperation and ...
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作者：Araujo, Aloisio; Chateauneuf, Alain; Faro, Jose Heleno
作者单位：Instituto Nacional de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (IMPA); IPAG Business School; Insper
摘要：It is well known that when an arbitrage-free financial market is incomplete or has tradable financial assets with frictions there must be multiple risk-neutral probability measures. The main motivation for the present study is to elucidate what type of market structure usually emerges from pricing rules. First, we obtain that finitely generated pricing rules, characterized by polytopes of probabilities, capture the class of all finite arbitrage-free financial markets that are potentially incom...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Li, Jiangtao
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Singapore Management University
摘要：An important question in mechanism design is whether there is any theoretical foundation for the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms. This paper studies the maxmin and Bayesian foundations of dominant strategy mechanisms in general social choice environments with quasi-linear preferences and private values. We propose a condition called the uniform shortest-path tree that, under regularity, ensures the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms. This exposes the underlying logic of the existe...
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作者：Carrasco, Vinicius; Luz, Vitor Farinha; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias; Monteiro, Paulo; Moreira, Humberto
作者单位：Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro; University of British Columbia; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Cologne
摘要：We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller who is partially informed about the distribution of buyer's valuations, only knowing its first N moments. The seller chooses the mechanism generating the best revenue guarantee based on the information available, that is, the optimal mechanism is chosen according to maxmin expected revenue. We show that the transfer function in the optimal mechanism is given by non-negative monotonic hull of a polynomial of degree N. This enables us to tran...
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作者：Sorokin, Constantine; Zakharov, Alexei
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); New Economic School
摘要：We study stochastic voting models where the candidates are allowed to have any smooth, strictly increasing utility functions that translate vote shares into payoffs. We find that if a strict Nash equilibrium exists in a model with an infinite number of voters, then nearby equilibria should exist for similar large, but finite, electorates. If the votes are independent random events, then equilibria will not depend on the utility functions of the candidates. Our results have implications for exi...
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作者：Honryo, Takakazu
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：This paper addresses the issue of risky shifts by a multi-sender signaling game. Senders compete in making proposals to be adopted by a group, hence they try to signal that they have the ability to correctly observe the state. This paper shows that senders tend to avoid making a moderate proposal, because a moderate proposal signals incompetence. When facing a moderate and a risky proposal, the group tends to adopt the risky one, and we have risky shifts as a result. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All...
