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作者：Ellis, Andrew
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper models an agent who has a limited capacity to pay attention to information and thus conditions her actions on a coarsening of the available information. An optimally inattentive agent chooses both her coarsening and her actions by maximization of an underlying subjective expected utility preference relation, net of a cognitive cost of attention. The main result axiomatically characterizes the conditional choices of actions by an agent that are necessary and sufficient for her behavi...
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作者：Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro
作者单位：Kyoto University; University of Osaka
摘要：We consider a bandit problem faced by a team of two heterogeneous players. The team is hierarchical in that one player (the principal) retains the exclusive right to terminate the project while the other player (the agent) focuses strictly on implementing the project assigned. As a key departure from the existing literature, we assume that the principal may be privately informed about the project quality. In contrast to the literature, the belief in our model generally follows a non-monotonic ...
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作者：Dutta, Rohan; Levine, David K.; Modica, Salvatore
作者单位：McGill University; European University Institute; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Palermo
摘要：We study common agency problems in which two principals (groups) make costly commitments to incentives that are conditioned on imperfect signals of the agent's action. Our framework allows for incentives to be either rewards or punishments. For our basic model we obtain a unique equilibrium, which typically involves randomization by both principals. Greater similarity between principals leads to more aggressive competition. The principals weakly prefer punishment to rewards, sometimes strictly...
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作者：Felli, Leonardo; Harris, Christopher
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper investigates the market provision of firm-specific training, and identifies the inefficiencies associated with it. Within a general stochastic learning-by-doing model, there is a potential inefficiency in the market provision of firm-specific training. In order to determine whether this inefficiency is in fact present, we analyze two special cases of the model: the accelerated productivity-enhancement model and the accelerated learning model. In both models, the inefficiency is inde...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Wu, Qinggong
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Aarhus University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：We model competition between two teams (that may differ in size) as an all-pay contest with incomplete information where team members exert effort to increase the performance of their own team. The team with the higher performance wins, and its members enjoy the prize as a public good. The value of the prize is identical to members of the same team but is unknown to those of the other team. We focus on the case in which a team's performance is the sum of its individual members' performances an...
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作者：Dufwenberg, Martin; Dufwenberg, Martin A.
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Arizona
摘要：We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher and Follmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, referred to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium, characterized by three intuitive properties, captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices)...
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作者：Fanning, Jack
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：I show how uncertainty about agents' future costs of delay can lead to substantial bargaining delays when agents have reputational concerns. Reputational concerns arise because with positive probability agents are behavioral types, committed to demanding a fixed share of the surplus. In equilibrium, rational agents may demand almost the entire surplus and then wait, with the deadlock only broken by the arrival of news about future costs, even as the probability of behavioral types vanishes. Al...
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作者：Geanakoplos, John; Walsh, Kieran James
作者单位：Yale University; The Santa Fe Institute; University of Virginia
摘要：We offer new sufficient conditions ensuring demand is downward sloping local to equilibrium. It follows that equilibrium is unique and stable in the sense that rising supply implies falling prices. In our setting, there are two goods, which we interpret as consumption in different time periods, and many impatience types. Agents have the same Bernoulli utility function, but the types differ arbitrarily in time preference. Our main result is that if endowments are identical and utility displays ...
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作者：Hashimoto, Tadashi
作者单位：Yeshiva University
摘要：This paper studies allocation problems with and without monetary transfers, such as combinatorial auctions, school choice, and course allocation. Interdependent values and multidimensional signals are allowed. Despite known negative results, a mechanism exists that is feasible, ex post individually rational, ex post incentive compatible, and asymptotically both efficient and envy-free. This mechanism is a special case of the generalized random priority mechanism (GRP), which always satisfies t...
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作者：Sultanum, Bruno
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：This paper studies the interaction between financial fragility and over-the-counter (OTC) markets. I model the financial sector as a large number of investors divided into different groups, which I interpret as financial institutions, and a large number of dealers. Financial institutions and dealers trade assets in an OTC market a la Duffie et al. (2005) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009). Investors receive privately observed preference shocks, and financial institutions use the balanced team mech...
