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作者：Priazhkina, Sofia; Page, Frank H.
作者单位：Bank of Canada; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：This paper presents a network formation game of buyers and sellers with market sharing. Prior to engaging in bargaining with buyers, sellers exchange access to buyers for negotiated payments to overcome search frictions. With homogeneous preferences, sharing increases market trade volume. Surprisingly, buyers benefit from sharing when sellers have stronger bargaining positions. With heterogeneous preferences, market sharing may decrease market trade volume. Also, when sellers have more bargain...
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作者：Zhang, Shengxing
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：To understand the illiquidity of the over-the-counter market when dealers and traders are in long-term relationships, I develop a framework to study the endogenous liquidity distortions resulting from the profit maximizing, screening behavior of dealers. The dealer offers the trading mechanism contingent on the aggregate history of his customers summarized by the asset allocation. The equilibrium distortion is type dependent: trade with small surplus breaks down; trade with intermediate surplu...
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作者：Alva, Samson
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：For combinatorial choice problems, I show that the Irrelevance of Rejected Items condition is equivalent to the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP), and is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a complete, reflexive and antisymmetric rationalization of a combinatorial choice function. I also show the equivalence of WARP to path independence and to other classical choice conditions when the choice domain is combinatorial. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Goldstein, Itay; Leitner, Yaron
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia
摘要：We study an optimal disclosure policy of a regulator that has information about banks (e.g., from conducting stress tests). In our model, disclosure can destroy risk-sharing opportunities for banks (the Hirshleifer effect). Yet, in some cases, some level of disclosure is necessary for risk sharing to occur. We provide conditions under which optimal disclosure takes a simple form (e.g., full disclosure, no disclosure, or a cutoff rule). We also show that, in some cases, optimal disclosure takes...
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作者：Dietrich, Franz
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：This paper proposes a simple unified framework of choice under changing awareness, addressing both outcome awareness and (nature) state awareness, and both how fine and how exhaustive the awareness is. Six axioms characterize an (essentially unique) expected-utility rationalization of preferences, in which utilities and probabilities are revised according to three revision rules when awareness changes: (R1) utilities of unaffected outcomes are transformed affinely; (R2) probabilities of unaffe...
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作者：Koray, Semih; Yildiz, Kemal
作者单位：Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：Implementation of socially desirable alternatives can be thought of as a way to design power distribution in a society such that the equilibrium outcomes coincide with the alternatives chosen at each preference profile. In this paper, we introduce a new institutional framework for implementation, which takes power distribution in a society as its point of departure. We use the notion of a rights structure, introduced by Sertel (2001), to formalize the power distribution in a society. We formul...
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作者：Mihm, Maximilian; Ozbek, Kemal
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of St Andrews
摘要：We model a decision maker who can exert costly effort to regulate herself, thereby reducing internal conflicts between her normative objectives and mood-driven choices. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the model, and show how costs of self-regulation can be elicited and compared across individuals. In a consumption-saving problem we show that self-regulation can generate unintended income effects, which have important implications for public policies on saving behavior. We also prov...
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作者：Miliner, Antony; Heal, Geoffrey
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Recent work on collective intertemporal choice suggests that non-dictatorial social preferences are generically time inconsistent. We argue that this claim conflates time consistency with two distinct properties of preferences: stationarity and time invariance. While time invariance and stationarity together imply time consistency, the converse does not hold. Although non-dictatorial social preferences cannot be stationary, they may be time consistent if time invariance is abandoned. If indivi...
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Condorelli, Daniele; Kim, Jinwoo
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Essex; Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：We study private value auctions in which bidders may collude without using side-payments. In our model, bidders coordinate their actions to achieve an outcome that interim-Pareto dominates the noncooperative outcome. We characterize auctions that are collusion-proof in the sense that no such coordination opportunities exist, and show that the efficient and revenue maximizing auctions are not collusion-proof unless all bidders exhibit a concave distribution of valuations. We then solve for reve...
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作者：Kalai, Ehud; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：The paper presents a model of large strategic dynamic interactions in an environment with uncertain fundamentals. The interaction is among a large finite group of interdependent players, diversified in their preferences and information. We study an imagined-continuum equilibrium, a behavioral hybrid of games with a continuum of players and finite games. This equilibrium enables simple Bayesian reasoning and admits natural Markov-perfect equilibria. In addition, we establish bounds on the proba...
