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作者：Araujo, Aloisio; Gama, Juan Pablo; Novinski, Rodrigo; Pascoa, Mario R.
作者单位：Instituto Nacional de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (IMPA); Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais; Faculdade de Economia e Financas do Ibmec; University of Surrey
摘要：When the discount factors that infinite lived consumers use at each date are not predetermined but are instead chosen within some set, depending on what the consumption plan is, impatience might not hold. More precisely, if the utility is the infimum of discounted utilities over that set of discount factor sequences, then preferences may be just upper semi-impatient. Such lack of lower semi-impatience, which we refer to as wariness, consists in neglecting distant gains but not distant losses. ...
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作者：Moreira, Alan
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：I build a model in which financial intermediation slows down capital flows. Investors optimally learn from intermediary performance to allocate capital toward profitable intermediaries. Intermediaries reach for yield-i.e., they invest in high-tail-risk assets-in an attempt to drive flows and reduce liquidation risk. Intermediaries with strong opportunities face a trade-off between choosing a portfolio that maximizes profitability, and choosing one that maximizes the speed at which capital flow...
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作者：Carrasco, Vinicius; Fuchs, William; Fukuda, Satoshi
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：This paper considers an optimal renegotiation-proof dynamic Bayesian mechanism in which two privately informed players repeatedly have to take a joint action without resorting to side-payments. We provide a general framework which accommodates as special cases committee decision and collective insurance problems. Thus, we formally connect these separate strands of literature. We show: (i) first-best values can be arbitrarily approximated (but not achieved) when the players are sufficiently pat...
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作者：Thomas, Caroline
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This paper adapts the exponential/Poisson bandits framework to a model of reputation concerns. The result is a dynamic signalling game with changing types. We study a decision-maker who must choose the stopping time for a project of unknown quality when she is concerned both about social welfare and public beliefs about her ability, which is correlated with the project's quality. The decision-maker privately observes a Poisson process that is informative about whether the project will succeed ...
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作者：Thomas, Jonathan P.; Worrall, Tim
作者单位：University of Edinburgh
摘要：This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who both undertake an action or investment that produces a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit for their own use. Agents have quasi-linear preferences. Two cases are considered: where agents are risk averse but where limited liability constraints do not bind, and where agents are risk neutral and subject to limited liability constraints. We ask how to structure the investments and di...
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作者：Baisa, Brian; Burkett, Justin
作者单位：Amherst College; Wake Forest University
摘要：We compare equilibrium bidding in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when a single large bidder (i.e., with multi-unit demand) competes against many small bidders, each with single-unit demands. We show that the large bidder prefers the discriminatory auction over the uniform-price auction, and we provide general conditions under which small bidders have the reverse preference. We use examples to show that the efficiency and revenue rankings of the two auctions are ambiguous. (C) 2017 E...
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作者：Cheung, Man-Wah; Wu, Jiabin
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Oregon
摘要：This paper proposes a framework that generalizes the discrete cultural transmission model of Bisin and Verdier (2001) to a continuous trait setting. We find that the resulting cultural evolutionary dynamic can be characterized as a continuous imitative dynamic in a population game. By using the properties of imitative dynamics, we show that as in Bisin and Verdier, cultural substitutability is the key that leads to cultural heterogeneity. Furthermore, we model an agent's cultural intolerance t...
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作者：Ayres, Joao; Navarro, Gaston; Nicolini, Juan Pablo; Teles, Pedro
作者单位：Inter-American Development Bank; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Banco de Portugal; Universidade Catolica Portuguesa; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：In the standard model of sovereign default, as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) or Arellano (2008), default is driven by fundamentals alone. There is no independent role for expectations. We show that small variations of that model are consistent with multiple interest rate equilibria, similar to the ones found in Calvo (1988). For distributions of output that are commonly used in the literature, the high interest rate equilibria have properties that make them fragile. Once output is drawn from a...
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作者：Kochov, Asen
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：The paper proposes a choice-theoretic definition of an unforeseen event and a model of behavior that accommodates such events. The analysis presumes an individual who is aware of their unawareness, which explains why all unforeseen events in this paper are non-null. Relative to existing work, the main contribution is to establish a distinction between unforeseen events and events whose likelihood is ambiguous. This is achieved by adopting a dynamic choice setting. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All ri...
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作者：Kellner, Christian; Le Quement, Mark T.
作者单位：University of Southampton; University of East Anglia
摘要：This paper proposes a model of ambiguous language. We consider a simple cheap talk game in which a sender who faces an ambiguity averse receiver is able to perform ambiguous randomization, i.e. to randomize according to unknown probabilities. We show that for any standard influential communication equilibrium there exists an equilibrium featuring an ambiguous communication strategy which Pareto-dominates it in terms of consistent planning ex ante utilities. Ambiguity, by triggering worst-case ...
