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作者：Gallin, Joshua; Verbrugge, Randal J.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
摘要：This paper offers the first theoretical explanation of housing rent stickiness and differential stickiness by housing structure type, key features of rental markets worldwide. Previous theoretical work on the subject is sparse and explains why some landlords charge below-market rents, not stickiness. Apart from its interest for understanding housing markets and overall inflation, rent stickiness is intriguing because it shows that stickiness can emerge in markets where the typical menu cost lo...
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作者：Tomoeda, Kentaro
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney
摘要：This paper identifies a condition for an efficient social choice rule to be fully implementable when we take into account investment efficiency. To do so, we extend the standard implementation problem to include endogenous ex ante and ex post investments. In our problem, the social planner aims to achieve efficiency in every equilibrium of a dynamic game in which agents strategically make investments before and after playing the mechanism. Our main theorem shows that a novel condition commitme...
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作者：He, Simin; Offerman, Theo; van de Ven, Jeroen
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Amsterdam
摘要：We study theoretically and experimentally the extent to which communication can solve coordination problems when there is some conflict of interest. We investigate various communication protocols, including one in which players chat sequentially and free-format. We develop a model based on the 'feigned-ignorance principle', according to which players ignore any communication unless they reach an agreement in which both players are (weakly) better off. With standard preferences, the model predi...
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作者：Pram, Kym
作者单位：Nevada System of Higher Education (NSHE); University of Nevada Reno
摘要：A target equilibrium in a game of complete information is called robust to incomplete information when all nearby games of incomplete information have equilibria that generate similar ex-ante distributions over actions to the distribution generated by the target equilibrium. Robustness to canonical elaborations considers only nearby games with a special structure. I show that robustness to incomplete information and robustness to canonical elaborations are equivalent when the equilibrium conce...
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作者：Basu, Pathikrit
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We interpret the problem of updating beliefs as a choice problem (selecting a posterior from a set of admissible posteriors) with a reference point (prior). We use AGM belief revision to define the support of admissible posteriors after arrival of information, which applies also to zero probability events. We study two classes of updating rules for probabilities: 1) lexicographic updating rules where posteriors are given by a lexicographic probability system 2) minimum distance updating rules ...
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作者：Erdil, Aytek; Kumano, Taro
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Yokohama National University
摘要：Many assignment mechanisms appeal to a priority structure to determine how over-subscribed indivisible goods are assigned to unit-demand individuals. We study substitutable priorities with ties which not only nest important classes of priorities and preferences studied in the literature, but also allow us to formalize plausible priority structures not captured in previous literature. Efficiency is typically in conflict with respecting priorities (i.e., stability), and therefore the natural wel...
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作者：Heumann, Tibor
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
摘要：This paper examines a single-unit ascending auction where agents observe two-dimensional Gaussian signals. The model combines the pure private-values model with the pure common-values model. The challenge is to characterize how the multi-dimensional signals observed by an agent are aggregated onto that agent's one-dimensional bid. The challenge is solved by projecting an agent's private signals onto a one-dimensional equilibrium statistic; the equilibrium bidding strategies are constructed as ...
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作者：Alva, Samson; Manjunath, Vikram
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio; University of Ottawa
摘要：We consider a model where each agent has an outside option of privately known value. At a given allocation, we call the set of agents who do not exercise their outside options the participants. We show that one strategy-proof and individually rational mechanism weakly Pareto-improves another if and only if, at each preference profile, it weakly expands (in terms of set inclusion) the set of participants. Corollaries include: a sufficient condition for a mechanism to be on the Pareto-efficient ...
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作者：Bando, Keisuke; Hirai, Toshiyuki; Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke
作者单位：Shinshu University; Shinshu University; Hosei University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Harvard University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We identify an error in the claim by Hatfield and Kominers (2015) that every stable outcome in the setting of multilateral matching with contracts is efficient. We then show that the result can be recovered under a suitable differentiability condition. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hillebrand, Elmar; Hillebrand, Marten
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model with an arbitrary number of different regions to study the economic consequences of climate change under alternative climate policies. Regions differ with respect to their state of economic development, factor endowments, and climate damages and trade on global markets for capital, output, and exhaustible resources. Our main result derives an optimal climate policy consisting of an emissions tax and a transfer policy. The optimal tax can ...
