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作者：Safronov, Mikhail
作者单位：University of Cambridge
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作者：Saghafian, Soroush
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) have been widely used as invaluable tools in dynamic decision making, which is a central concern for economic agents operating at both the micro and macro levels. Often the decision maker's information about the state is incomplete; hence, the generalization to Partially Observable MDPs (POMDPs). Unfortunately, POMDPs may require a large state and/or action space, creating the well-known curse of dimensionality. However, recent computational contributions and b...
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作者：Bohacek, Radim; Kejak, Michal
作者单位：Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：In this paper we develop a new approach for finding optimal government policies in economies with heterogeneous agents. Using the calculus of variations, we present three classes of equilibrium conditions from government's and individual agent's optimization problems: 1) the first order conditions: the government's Lagrange-Euler equation and the individual agent's Euler equation; 2) the stationarity condition on the distribution function; and, 3) the aggregate market clearing conditions. Thes...
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作者：Choi, Michael
作者单位：University of Iowa
摘要：This paper studies asset markets where owners of assets do not inherit private information from previous owners after a transaction and must learn about asset quality over time. Instantaneous learning by owners maximizes the number of owners with private information, but also maximizes the trading volume and welfare. This result is contrary to the traditional view that information asymmetry hurts trade efficiency. Public disclosure of information is not always optimal and its welfare implicati...
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作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We provide a simple upper bound on the Nash equilibrium payoff set at a fixed discount factor in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. The bound admits a tractable recursive characterization and can thus be applied off-the-shelf' to any repeated game. The bound is not tight in general, but it is tight if the stage game is concave or if a certain form of observable mixed actions is allowed. We illustrate our results with applications to the repeated prisoners' dilemma and to canonic...
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作者：Alonso, Ricardo; Camara, Odilon
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Southern California
摘要：We consider a persuasion model in which a sender influences the actions of a receiver by selecting an experiment (public signal) from a set of feasible experiments. We ask: does the sender benefit from becoming an expert-observing a private signal prior to her selection? We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a sender to never gain by becoming informed. Our key condition (sequential redundancy) shows that the informativeness of public experiments can substitute for the sender's exp...
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作者：Aoyagi, Masaki
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：Two firms engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either firm to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who adopt the same good. When the size of externalities increases linearly with the number of adoptions, we identify the set of pricing strategies that are consistent with an equilibrium in which one of the firms monopolizes the market. The set includes marginal cost (MC) pricing as well as bipartition pricing, which o...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Mohlin, Erik
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; Lund University
摘要：In various environments new agents may base their decisions on observations of actions taken by a few other agents in the past. In this paper we analyze a broad class of such social learning processes, and study under what circumstances the initial behavior of the population has a lasting effect. Our results show that this question strongly depends on the expected number of actions observed by new agents. Specifically, we show that if the expected number of observed actions is: (1) less than o...
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作者：Duffle, Darrell; Qiao, Lei; Sun, Yeneng
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; National University of Singapore
摘要：We develop a general and unified model in which a continuum of agents conduct directed random searches for counterparties. Our results provide the first probabilistic foundation for static and dynamic models of directed search (including the matching-function approach) that are common in search-based models of financial markets, monetary theory, and labor economics. The agents' types are shown to be independent discrete-time Markov processes that incorporate the effects of random mutation, ran...
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作者：Kurmann, Andre; Rabinovich, Stanislav
作者单位：Drexel University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine
摘要：We study the efficiency implications of bargaining in frictional capital markets in which firms match bilaterally with dealers in order to buy or sell capital. We show how two of the distinguishing characteristics of capital ownership and the intertemporal nature of investment give rise to a dynamic inefficiency. Firms that anticipate buying capital in the future overinvest because this increases their outside option of no trade in negotiations with dealers in the future, thereby lowering the ...
