Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ehlers, Lars
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.008
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 393-407
• 关键词: General allocation problems; externalities; strategy-proofness; IR-core

摘要

We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the individually-rationalcore (IR-core) whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their endowments. We show that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness, then for any problem for which the IR-core is non-empty, the allocation rule must choose an IR-core allocation and all agents are indifferent between all allocations in the IR-core. We further show that the result cannot be generalized to supersets of the IR-core. We apply our result to housing markets, coalition formation and networks. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.