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作者：Espino, Emilio; Kozlowski, Julian; Sanchez, Juan M.
作者单位：Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; New York University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis
摘要：Private information may limit insurance possibilities when two agents get together to pool idiosyncratic risk. However, if there is capital accumulation, bilateral insurance possibilities may improve because misreporting distorts investment. We show that if one of the Pareto weights is sufficiently large, that agent does not have incentives to misreport. This implies that, under some conditions, the full information allocation is incentive compatible when agents have equal Pareto weights. In t...
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作者：Mackowiak, Bartosz; Matejka, Filip; Wiederholt, Mirko
作者单位：European Central Bank; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：This paper presents analytical results for dynamic rational inattention problems as in Sims (2003). The agent tracks an optimal action that follows a Gaussian process. The agent chooses the properties of the signals that he receives, so as to minimize the mean squared difference between his action and the optimal action, subject to a constraint on information flow. We prove that the optimal signal is a one-dimensional signal about the elements of the state vector, which typically has non-zero ...
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作者：Ali, S. Nageeb
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This paper incorporates costly information into a model of observational learning. Individuals would like to avoid the cost of buying information and free-ride on the public history. The paper characterizes when learning is nevertheless complete. Necessary and sufficient conditions for complete learning follow from an elementary principle: a player purchases information only if it can influence her action. With a coarse action space, learning is complete if and only if for every cost c > 0, a ...
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作者：Ghirardato, Paolo; Siniscalchi, Marciano
作者单位：University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Turin; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper analyzes risk sharing in economies with no aggregate uncertainty when agents have non convex preferences. In particular, agents need not be globally risk-averse, or uncertainty-averse in the sense of Schmeidler (1989). We identify a behavioral condition under which betting is inefficient (i.e., every Pareto-efficient allocation provides full insurance, and conversely) if and only if agents' supporting probabilities (defined as in Rigotti et al., 2008) have a non-empty intersection. ...
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作者：Camacho, Carmen; Kamihigashi, Takashi; Saglam, Cagri
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Kobe University; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：A policy change that involves a redistribution of income or wealth is typically controversial, affecting some people positively but others negatively. In this paper we extend the robust comparative statics result for large aggregative games established by Acemoglu and Jensen (2010) to possibly controversial policy changes. In particular, we show that both the smallest and the largest equilibrium values of an aggregate variable increase in response to a policy change to which individuals' react...
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作者：Ashlagi, Itai; Gonczarowski, Yannai A.
作者单位：Stanford University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a growing amount of empirical evidence reveals that applicants misrepresent their preferences when this mechanism is used. This paper shows that no mechanism that implements a stable matching is obviously strategy-proof for any side of the market, a stronger in...
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作者：Frug, Alexander
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：Prior to advising a decision maker, the expert needs to gather some relevant information. This often takes time, and therefore, even if the expert's learning process is unobservable, the timing of advice can be informative in itself. If, in addition, the expert can choose which experiments to perform, the timing of her advice may reveal not only the amount but also the type of information at her disposal. This paper studies a dynamic information transmission problem where a biased expert acqui...
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作者：Carvajal, Andres; Rostek, Marzena; Sublet, Guillaume
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; Getulio Vargas Foundation; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Universite de Montreal; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：Could a firm benefit from not disclosing all of its private information before its stock is traded in public financial markets? So long as the investors' marginal utility function is convex and the investors differ only in their risk-sharing needs, three substantive results hold: (1) a full disclosure policy minimizes the value of the firm; (2) lifting a mandate of full disclosure does not imply that firms will necessarily choose to withhold information maximally; and (3) with many firms that ...
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作者：Cherchye, Laurens; Demuynck, Thomas; De Rock, Bram
作者单位：KU Leuven; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We study the testable implications of normal demand in a two-goods setting. For a finite dataset on prices and quantities, we present the revealed preference conditions for normality of one or both goods. Our characterization provides an intuitive extension of the well-known Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, and is easy to use in practice. We illustrate the empirical relevance of our theoretical results through an application to an experimental dataset. We also briefly discuss extensions of o...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Vivek; Manuelli, Lucas; Straub, Ludwig
作者单位：Northwestern University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper proposes a model of signal distortion in a two-player game with imperfect public monitoring. We construct a tractable theoretical framework where each player has the opportunity to distort the true public signal and each player is uncertain about the distortion technologies available to the other player. We show that when players evaluate strategies according to their worst-case guarantees i.e., are ambiguity averse over certain distributions in the environment perceived continuatio...
