An efficient ascending auction for private valuations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baranov, Oleg
• 署名单位: University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.005
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 495-517
• 关键词: Combinatorial auctions; Iterative auctions; Vickrey auction; Dynamic auctions; ascending auctions

摘要

Known dynamic implementations of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism in general private-value auction settings utilize non-linear (not additively-separable over goods) and non-anonymous (bidder-specific) prices. The need for non-linear and non-anonymous prices - a complication that is often difficult to implement in practice - arises from limiting attention to elicitation processes based on demand queries (i.e., asking bidders to report their demands at posted prices). In this paper, we relax this restriction and allow the auctioneer to supplement demand queries with marginal value queries (i.e., requests to report value differences between pairs of commodity bundles) as needed. This added flexibility enables an iterative ascending auction design that achieves efficiency despite using linear and anonymous prices. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.