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作者：HARRINGTON, JE
摘要：This paper explores price-setting behavior in the context of a duopoly in which firms are uncertain about the degree of product differentiation. Firms learn from the difference in their realized demands in light of the price differential. The informativeness of this market experiment is shown to be increasing in the size of the price differential. In markets with highly substitutable products, price dispersion is enhanced as firms adjust their prices so as to generate more information. In mark...
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作者：JOHNSON, MR
摘要：Ideals are used to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for classes of semigroups to be associated with classes of choice functions satisfying the Strong Axiom of Preference, the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, or Path Independence. Semigroups whose choice functions are not path indpendent are demonstrated to lack proper ideal structures. A subsemigroup which is a monoid is identified. A motivation for interest in these structures is that the semigroup property is required of all fin...
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作者：LEWIS, TR; SAPPINGTON, DEM
摘要：We examine optimal insurance policies in a setting where some individuals are perfectly informed about the benefits they would receive under any proposed plan, and others share the insurance provider's imperfect knowledge about likely benefits. The optimal insurance policy is shown to take on a particularly simple linear form, providing full insurance for the smallest and the largest wealth realizations, and no insurance for a range of intermediate wealth realizations. This basic form of the o...
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作者：VINCENT, DR
摘要：This note shows by means of an example that in a common-value auction a seller with a random reservation value can increase her ex ante expected profits by following a policy of conducting an auction in which her reserve price is kept secret compared to an auction in which the reserve price is announced. By keeping the reserve price secret, the seller is able to encourage greater participation from the bidders and can, therefore, increase the linkage of the price paid to the value of the purch...
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作者：DEMANGE, G; LAROQUE, G
摘要：The privileged information that the owners have on their firms may discourage rational financial investors and consequently may prevent the entrepreneurs from floating their company on the market. The paper studies the validity of this argument in a model similar to that of Grossman and Stiglitz [8]: an entrepeneur who contemplates issuing a new security faces a trade-off between speculative gains, which arise from his privileged information, and an insurance motive, associated with the insura...
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作者：KAN, R
摘要：A recursive method is given for constructing all Pareto optimal allocations for a dynamic economy under Markov certainty in which consumer preferences are recursive. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：CREANE, A
摘要：Can a firm (F) cause a rival (R) to learn less about R? Does F care? I explore F's ability and incentive to affect, or ''jam,'' R's private learning about R. The model developed does not have unobserved actions or ex ante asymmetric information which previous jamming models require. I find that F wants R not to learn and the more uncertain F believes R is, the more F wants to jam R's learning. Entry deterrence increases with an entrant's uncertainty, causing R to want F to believe that R is mo...
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作者：OHASHI, K
作者单位：University of Tsukuba
摘要：This paper studies the determination of the number of futures contracts created by an exchange. We show that though the exchange can create the futures contracts costlessly; if the investors have differential information, there may be an upper bound on the number of contracts that the exchange is willing to create. In a stylized economy, we investigate what type of contracts and how many of these the exchange is willing to create. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, D82...
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作者：MIRMAN, LJ; SAMUELSON, L; SCHLEE, EE
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper studies a duopoly market in which firms can draw inferences concerning (uncertain) market demand from observations of their outputs and market price. Firms may adjust their outputs away from myopically optimal levels to affect the informativeness of the market price. Because firms' quantities are observed, firms can manipulate the extent to which belief revision occurs rather than the direction in which beliefs are revised (as in signal-jamming models). We develop conditions and pre...
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作者：BOARD, R
摘要：This paper explores the conditions under which agents can learn enough about an economy to form rational expectations. The agents' rationality is bounded by limiting their computational resources to algorithms with running time bounded by a polynomial in the relevant problem parameters. We characterize the classes of price functions and economies that agents can learn under these assumptions and present a result that suggests that it is unlikely that agents can learn even those price functions...
