INSURANCE, ADVERSE SELECTION, AND CREAM-SKIMMING
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
LEWIS, TR; SAPPINGTON, DEM
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1012
发表日期：
1995
页码：
327-358
关键词：
摘要：
We examine optimal insurance policies in a setting where some individuals are perfectly informed about the benefits they would receive under any proposed plan, and others share the insurance provider's imperfect knowledge about likely benefits. The optimal insurance policy is shown to take on a particularly simple linear form, providing full insurance for the smallest and the largest wealth realizations, and no insurance for a range of intermediate wealth realizations. This basic form of the optimal insurance policy persists in dynamic settings and those with endogenous information acquisition. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.